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In-Depth Analysis· Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean explained

What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?

What is the Seville Map? See how it confines Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya, what Greece, Cyprus and the EU say, and why Ankara rejects it in law.

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Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a maritime graphic produced by researchers at the University of Seville, reported to date from the mid-2000s and associated with work for the European Union. It is cited in Greek and Greek Cypriot arguments because it depicts full continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) entitlements for Greek islands. In that depiction Türkiye's zone is squeezed into a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya.

It matters because it shows how a single map can shape the Eastern Mediterranean debate over energy, fisheries and navigation. Ankara rejects it as legally baseless: it argues that boundaries must be set by agreement or adjudication on the principle of equity, not drawn in a study. For the wider framework, see Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye's Maritime Jurisdiction Explained.

Background

What the Seville Map is

The map comes from an academic study by a University of Seville team. It was reported to have been prepared for EU purposes in the mid-2000s and applies a particular reading of maritime entitlements to the Eastern Mediterranean. It became widely known in Türkiye and Greece in the 2010s and especially around 2020, when Eastern Mediterranean tensions rose.

Three points frame its status:

  • It is not a treaty, an arbitral award or a court judgment.
  • It is not a delimitation agreed between any two coastal states.
  • Its circulation and use in political argument is a separate matter from its legal value.

Greek officials have generally framed Greece's claims in terms of UNCLOS and customary law rather than the map itself. The map is nonetheless often used as an illustration of the maximum Greek and Greek Cypriot position.

What it depicts

The map treats islands such as Kastellorizo (Meis), Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete as generating full continental shelf and EEZ rights. Kastellorizo is about 2 km (1.2 miles) off the Turkish mainland and well over 500 km (about 310 miles) from the Greek mainland. Applying full effect to such a small island pushes Greek-attributed zones close to the Turkish coast. Türkiye is left with a narrow strip of sea in the Gulf of Antalya, even though it has about 870 km of coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, the longest of any state there.

Chronology of key steps

Date Development
1982 UNCLOS adopted. Türkiye did not become a party.
2003 Republic of Cyprus–Egypt EEZ agreement. Türkiye objects, saying it overlaps its continental shelf.
2004 onward Türkiye begins lodging Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN.
2007 / 2010 Cyprus–Lebanon and Cyprus–Israel EEZ agreements. Ankara objects on its own and Turkish Cypriot grounds.
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, two days after unilateral Greek Cypriot drilling began.
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction memorandum. Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the EU reject it.
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN.
Aug 2020 Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement. Türkiye rejects it.
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Türkiye announces its Marine Spatial Planning and records it with IOC-UNESCO.

UNCLOS Article 121 says islands generate maritime zones, but 'rocks' that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life have no EEZ or continental shelf. Articles 74 and 83 require delimitation 'on the basis of international law' to reach 'an equitable solution'. Case law has developed the methods in practice: the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977), Tunisia/Libya (1982), Libya/Malta (1985), Romania v. Ukraine (2009), the Bay of Bengal case (ITLOS, 2012) and Nicaragua v. Colombia (ICJ, 2012).

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, islands have the same maritime entitlements as other land territory under UNCLOS Article 121. Athens holds that these rights are part of customary international law, binding on all states including those outside UNCLOS. It says that the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ with Türkiye is the only dispute to be resolved, and that it should go to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or be settled by agreement. Greece also rejects the 2019 Türkiye–Libya memorandum as ignoring the island of Crete.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Republic of Cyprus, the internationally recognized government of the island, relies on its EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It says it acts within its sovereign rights, and that hydrocarbon resources will benefit all Cypriots under a future settlement. It rejects the Türkiye–TRNC agreement as having no basis because Türkiye does not recognize the Republic and the TRNC is not recognized.

The European Union

European Council conclusions in 2019 and 2020 expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus and called for respect for their sovereignty and sovereign rights. The EU describes UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law, and it supports dialogue and peaceful settlement. The EU has never been a negotiating party to a Greece–Türkiye boundary. EU institutions do not claim a power to draw one, but their conclusions and political backing do shape the context in which the map is cited.

The Turkish Cypriots (TRNC)

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Türkiye, argues that Turkish Cypriots, as co-owners of the island, have equal rights over offshore resources. It has put forward hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals in 2011, 2012 and 2019. For the Cyprus background, see The Cyprus Issue: 1960 Treaties, 1974 and the Case for a Sovereign Equal Two-State Solution.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources · Legal Basis

Türkiye's Position

The following reflects official Turkish policy as set out in statements of the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Presidency, and Türkiye's communications to the UN.

  • Equity governs delimitation, and islands cannot cut off a mainland's projection. According to the MFA, boundaries between opposite and adjacent coasts must be settled by agreement on the basis of equity, taking account of coastal geography, proportionality and all relevant circumstances. Ankara points to Tunisia/Libya (1982), Libya/Malta (1985) and the Anglo-French Arbitration (1977) as cases where courts gave small islands limited or reduced effect. It also points to Romania v. Ukraine (2009), where Serpents' Island was given no effect on the boundary line. The Bay of Bengal case (2012) and Nicaragua v. Colombia (2012) point the same way. The Seville Map does the opposite: it gives full effect to islands close to the Turkish coast and penalizes the state with the longest mainland coast.
  • No map or political body can delimit a boundary. Ankara argues that a boundary between two states needs an agreement or an adjudication that binds them. A university study is neither, whatever its origin. The MFA also says that the EU has no competence to adjudicate maritime delimitation disputes, so invoking 'Union solidarity' cannot turn one side's maximal claims into law. Türkiye also notes that it is not a party to UNCLOS. It has said that, among other reasons, the convention allows no reservations and does not give adequate weight to special geographical situations.
  • Türkiye has recorded its position with the UN and UNESCO bodies. It has filed Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates since 2004, registered the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN on 18 March 2020, and announced its Marine Spatial Planning on 16 April 2025. It recorded that plan with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, which Ankara describes as the first time its maritime position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean was recorded with a UN body. A Presidential Circular of 24 July 2025 set up an inter-agency coordination board under the MFA.
  • Turkish Cypriots have inherent rights over offshore resources. Ankara holds that the two peoples of Cyprus are co-founders under the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements and the 1960 settlement, so no resource arrangement that excludes Turkish Cypriots can be valid. It points to the Türkiye–TRNC agreement of 21 September 2011. See also Treaty of Guarantee and the 1974 Intervention: Was Türkiye's Action Legal?.
  • Dialogue remains open to all coastal states. The Presidency has repeated the call, first made in 2020, for an Eastern Mediterranean conference that includes all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots. Türkiye backs its sovereign rights with licenses issued to the state oil company TPAO in 2009 and 2012. The drilling ships Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han, and the seismic vessel Oruç Reis, support this activity. Ankara says no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can last.

The legal approach in short: Ankara treats the Seville Map as a cartographic opinion and not as a source of law. The legal test is equity, not the maximum geometric effect of every island. This section is Türkiye's own argument. Greece, Cyprus and the EU dispute it, and no court has so far ruled between the parties.

Source Comparison

Question Greek / Greek Cypriot / EU framing Turkish official framing
Status of the map A study that illustrates entitlements under UNCLOS; official claims rest on the Convention, not on the map. A maximalist cartographic claim with no legal force, used to build political pressure.
Island effect Islands generate full zones under Article 121, including Kastellorizo, and this is customary law. Case law reduces or denies effect where an island distorts a boundary against a longer mainland coast.
Role of the EU Political solidarity and respect for the sovereign rights of its member states. No competence over delimitation, and an interested party in the dispute.
Applicable law UNCLOS and customary law, with recourse to the ICJ. Equity and the relevant circumstances. Türkiye is not an UNCLOS party and holds that agreement is the proper route.
Turkish Cypriots The Republic of Cyprus acts for the whole island and will share benefits in a settlement. Turkish Cypriots have equal, inherent rights as co-owners.
Way forward Court adjudication or bilateral delimitation, with sovereignty respected. A conference of all coastal states, including the Turkish Cypriots, and delimitation by agreement.

International media often describe the dispute as a Greek–Turkish quarrel over 'drilling'. Turkish primary sources stress delimitation, geography and Turkish Cypriot rights. Readers should check each side's own statements and the texts of UNCLOS and the judgments. For how this site handles sourcing, see Editorial Principles: How Regionalbalance Separates Fact from Position and the Fact Check page on common claims.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coastal state's land territory; it governs rights over seabed resources.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles in which the coastal state has sovereign rights over resources.
  • Equity principle (hakkaniyet ilkesi): the rule that delimitation must achieve an 'equitable solution' taking account of relevant circumstances.
  • Island effect: the weight an island is given when a boundary is drawn; it can be full, partial or none.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • UNCLOS: the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Türkiye has not joined.

Related guides:

Regionalbalance presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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Frequently asked questions

What is the Seville Map?

It is a maritime graphic from a University of Seville study, reported to date from the mid-2000s and linked to EU work. It shows full continental shelf and EEZ zones for Greek islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is not a treaty, court ruling or adopted EU legal act.

Why does the Seville Map confine Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya?

Because it gives islands such as Kastellorizo, which lies about 2 km off the Turkish coast, full maritime zones. Those zones meet near the Turkish mainland and leave Türkiye a narrow strip. Türkiye argues this ignores its 870 km coastline, the longest in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Is the Seville Map legally binding?

No. A boundary becomes binding through an agreement between the states concerned or a decision of a court or tribunal they accept. Neither exists for the Greece–Türkiye continental shelf and EEZ. Greek and EU sources rest their positions on UNCLOS and not on the map itself.

What do Greece, Cyprus and the EU say about it?

Greece holds that islands have full maritime rights under UNCLOS Article 121 and favors court adjudication or agreement. The Republic of Cyprus relies on its EEZ agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel. EU Council conclusions in 2019 and 2020 expressed solidarity with both states and backed their sovereign rights.

Why does Türkiye say the EU cannot decide maritime boundaries?

According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, delimitation is a matter for the coastal states concerned, through agreement or adjudication. The EU is not a coastal state and has no competence to draw boundaries. Ankara adds that two EU members are parties to the dispute.

Has Türkiye registered its maritime claims internationally?

Yes. It has filed Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates with the UN since 2004 and registered its outer limits on 18 March 2020. It recorded its Marine Spatial Planning with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025. Greece and Cyprus do not accept these as defining valid boundaries.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Regionalbalance presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

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